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Holding Fast:  The Persistence and Dominance of Gender Stereotypes 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In any number of situations it may be necessary for one party to make judgments as to the risk 
preferences of another:  a lawyer negotiating a plea agreement for her client; a financial advisor 
developing an investment plan for a family; a doctor prescribing a course of treatment for his 
patient; or a real estate agent recommending how to market a seller’s property.  Oftentimes this 
judgment is based on fairly limited information.  In many cases, the prediction may be based on 
little more than the predictor’s ―read‖ of the individual.  Financial advisors frequently have their 
clients complete a short risk assessment survey, but even this type of instrument is likely to give 
only a cursory indication of a client’s true risk preferences and is likely not tested for reliability.   
In such circumstances, predicting the risk preferences of another may constitute a guess informed 
by little more than visual or verbal clues provided in a brief meeting.  Lacking more relevant 
information, the predictor may resort to stereotypes to inform his prediction.  
Stereotyping is the act of assigning to a member of a particular group a characteristic or 
trait based solely on the individual’s membership in that group.  An individual is not seen as a 
distinct being with his own individual attributes but solely as a member of a group conforming to 
some pattern.  In cases where individuating, judgment-relevant information is not available, 
drawing on stereotypes may improve one’s ability to predict another’s actions (assuming the 
stereotype contains some kernel of truth).   When presented with individuating, judgment-
relevant information regarding the characteristic or action being predicted, downplaying any 
stereotype in favor of this information should improve the accuracy of predictions.   
Whether men and women differ in their attitudes toward risk and in their willingness to 
accept risk is the subject of much debate.  Most evidence suggests that women perceive   3 
situations as inherently riskier than men perceive the same situations, women engage in less 
risky behavior, and they choose alternatives that involve less risk.
1  Consistent with the evidence 
of a gender difference in risk aversion, Ball et al. (2008), Daruvala (2007), Eckel and Grossman 
(2008, EG hereafter), Grossman and Lugovskyy (2011), and Siegrist et al. (2002) report 
evidence suggesting that women are perceived to be more risk averse than men; when predicting 
the risk choices of others, experiment subjects apply the gender stereotype. 
This paper tests the relative importance of individuating information and gender 
stereotypes when predicting the risk preferences of others.  For this study, all subjects participate 
in a four-part experiment.  First, each subject completes a risk-assessment survey.  Second, they 
then each select a gamble to play from a set of six gambles differing in expected payoff and 
degree of risk.  Third, each subject then attempts to predict the gamble choice of every other 
subject.  In one treatment, subjects make initial predictions having only visual clues regarding 
each subject (i.e., subjects stand up one at a time).  Finally, subjects are permitted to revise their 
predictions after being provided individuating information (i.e., the other subjects’ responses to 
two of the risk-assessment survey questions). In the second treatment, the order is reversed and 
predictions are first made based on survey responses and then predictions are reassessed based 
upon visual clues. 
I find: 1) additional evidence of the existence of gender stereotyping, and more 
importantly, 2) the persistence of such stereotyping even when other individuating, both 
judgment-relevant and judgment-irrelevant, information is provided.  Results indicate that in 
isolation both the gender stereotype and the individuating information condition initial 
predictions.  However, and more importantly, when visual clues are provided first, the revised 
predictions, after a subject’s survey responses are known, only marginally reduce the evidence of   4 
stereotyping.  When the individuating survey responses are provided first, the provision of the 
visual clues leads to systematic revisions in predictions consistent with gender stereotyping.  The 
results suggest that individuating information is dominated by the gender stereotype. 
Section II reviews the relevant literature.  Section III explains the experimental design 
and procedures.  Section IV presents the results of the experiment and Section V draws 
conclusions from the results. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Psychology literature has extensively addressed how and when social stereotypes are used in 
judging others.  Dual-process theories argue that there are two different ways of judging a 
person:  either by relying on social stereotypes or by assessing the individual’s specific attributes 
or qualities.
2  Gill (2004, p. 629) argues that the general conclusion is that ―…judgment-relevant 
behavioral information can undercut stereotyping in judgments of individual group members.‖  
However, this conclusion is not universally supported.  Nisbett et al. (1981) and Beckett and 
Park (1995) argue that the dominance of individuating information over stereotypes is only 
evident when considering weak stereotypes or when the individuating information was made 
salient and the stereotypes were not made salient.  Studies by Sherman (1996) and Trope and 
Thompson (1997) find that stereotypes dominate individuating information.  Kunda et al. (1997) 
find that individuating information weakens the effects of stereotypes regarding assessment of a 
target’s traits but has little effect on stereotypes when predicting the same target’s trait-related 
behavior.   
Bodenhausen et al. (1999, 280-281) note that ―[W]ell-educated undergraduates may often 
be quite reluctant to furnish stereotypic reactions and may well be on their guard to censor such   5 
responses when their behavior is being monitored by a researcher.‖  This highlights an important 
difference between many psychology experiments and economic experiments.  The typical 
subject (at least historically) in a psychology experiment is an undergraduate participating as a 
requirement of his or her psychology class.  The salient incentive is the requirement to show up; 
the actual decisions made are independent of any reward received.  The typical subject in an 
economics experiment is an undergraduate participating voluntarily.  The salient incentive is the 
possibility of earning money with the actual decisions made directly affecting the amount of 
money earned.  In this experiment, a predictor increases his earnings if he correctly predicts the 
behavior of a target.  If the predictor believes a stereotype has predictive ability, he has less 
incentive to censor his response than he would in an experiment without salient incentives.      
Early tests of stereotyping and risk preference predictions were conducted by Hsee and 
Weber (1997 and 1998) and Siegrist et al. (2002).  Hsee and Weber (1998) present evidence that 
both Chinese and American subjects predict that Americans are more risk-seeking than Chinese, 
whereas the reverse is true in practice.  They suggest that forecasts are based on stereotypes due 
to television portrayals of Americans as risk-seeking.  A second study, reported in Hsee and 
Weber (1997), finds that the difference between one’s own risk preferences and the risk 
preferences predicted for others increases with social distance. Both of these studies involve 
hypothetical stakes and the ―others‖ in the studies were also hypothetical.    In addition, their 
subjects had no monetary incentive to forecast accurately.  A third test reported in Hsee and 
Weber (1997) gives a small monetary incentive to forecast correctly and generates the same 
pattern. Neither study examines gender differences.  Siegrist et al. (2002) report a pattern of 
predictions suggesting that ―…gender stereotypes and own-based risk preferences influence   6 
predictions about other individuals.‖  This study also involves hypothetical stakes, which reduce 
the motivation to predict the risk preferences of others accurately.   
The first study to investigate gender differences in forecasts in an environment with 
substantial stakes is EG.  In the EG study, all subjects first selected one of five 50/50 gambles to 
play.  One gamble was a sure thing ($10); the remaining four increased linearly in expected 
earnings and risk (defined as standard deviation in earnings).  Subjects, acting as predictors, then 
tried to predict which of the five gambles each of the other subjects, acting as targets, selected.  
The only information provided about a target was what could be observed visually (i.e., when a 
target’s risk choice was to be predicted, that target stood so the predictors could view him/her).
3  
EG find that, consistent with gender stereotyping, predictors predicted females to be more risk 
averse than males and that predictors underpredict the risk preferences of the targets, but the 
prediction error is greater for female targets than for male targets. 
Daruvala (2007) uses as her risk instrument a modification of the Becker Degroot 
Marschack instrument to assess subjects’ risk attitudes.  She finds that men’s certainty 
equivalence is less than women’s, but the difference is not significant.  Subjects then predicted 
the certainty equivalence for each of the other participants in the experiment.  Consistent with 
EG, Daruvala finds that both male and female predictors predict significantly lower certainty 
equivalences for female targets than male targets.   
Grossman and Lugovskyy (2011) use EG’s risk instrument (modified to include a sixth 
gamble choice) and then have predictors make predictions in one of three treatments.
4  The first 
treatment uses the EG procedure, providing predictors only visual clues on which to base their 
predictions.  In the second treatment predictors receive no visual clues but instead are provided 
the targets’ responses to two statements from the Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) risk preference   7 
survey (one of which is a gamble-oriented statement).  For the third treatment predictors receive 
both the visual clues and the responses to the two survey statements.  Grossman and Lugovskyy 
report results consistent with persistent gender stereotyping.  Even when provided the 
individuating, judgment-relevant information, the target’s responses to the risk survey 
statements, predictors still made predictions consistent with gender stereotyping.  
The Ball et al. (2010) study largely follows the EG study procedures with the exception 
that predictors were instructed to act as a financial advisor, and choose a gamble from the 
alternatives for each of the targets in the room.  The ―advisors‖ also completed four survey items 
assessing the appearance of the targets on the following scales:  attractive/unattractive, 
weak/strong, rich/poor, irresponsible/responsible.  Ball et al. report that ―…advisors make 
choices based on the appearance of the target (attractiveness, size, gender), and that advice 
reflects stereotypes.  Lower-risk, lower-return gambles are chosen for targets who are female, 
smaller (in stature), and less-attractive … evidence that stereotypes strongly influence financial 
advice in the lab.‖ 
 
3.  THE EXPERIMENT 
3.1.  Design 
The experiment consists of four tasks: a psychological survey measure of risk attitudes, a gamble 
choice with substantial financial stakes, predictions of others’ gamble choices, and the ability to 
revise predictions of others’ gamble choices.  For the first task, subjects are asked to complete 
the Weber et al. (2002) Domain Specific, Risk-Attitude Scale (DSRAS) survey. (See Appendix 
for instructions and forms for all four tasks of the experiment.)  They are informed they will earn   8 
$8 for completing the survey.
5  But the subjects are made aware that this money may be at risk at 
a later stage of the experiment.   
The DSRAS survey consists of 50 statements.  The survey is designed to measure risk 
attitudes across five domains: financial, ethical, health/safety, recreational, and social.  Subjects 
indicate on a 5-point Likert scale both their likelihood of engaging in a risky activity (1 = 
extremely unlikely; 5 = extremely likely), their perception of the risk associated with that activity 
(1 = not at all risky; 5 = extremely risky), and the benefits they expected they would obtain from 
each situation (1 = no benefits at all; 5 = great benefits).  Sample statements include: 
Arguing with a friend, who has a very different opinion on an issue (Social). 
Investing 10% of your annual income in a very speculative stock (Financial). 
Buying an illegal drug for your own use (Health). 
Chasing a tornado by car to take photos that you can sell to the press (Recreational). 
Cheating on an exam (Ethical).
6 
For the second task, we use the same risk instrument employed by Grossman and 
Lugovskyy (2011), which is an adaptation of the instrument introduced by Eckel and Grossman 
(2002; 2008).
7  Subjects are presented with six different gambles.  Each gamble has two 
outcomes, each with equal probability of occurring.  Table 1 lists the six gambles, their payoffs 
and risk (subjects only receive columns 1 – 4 of Table 1).  The gambles (excluding gamble 6) are 
designed so that their expected payoff and risk increase linearly.
8  Gamble 1 offers a sure payoff 
of $10.  The expected payoff increased by $2 with each of gambles 2 through 5.  Gamble 6 has 
the same payoff as Gamble 5 but with higher associated risk.  This gamble is included to 
distinguish the risk-lovers.  Gambles 1-3 offer positive payoffs regardless of the outcome.  
Gambles 4-6 have negative payoffs should outcome B occur.  All subjects in a session select one   9 
gamble to be played at a later stage in the experiment.  They are informed that if they select a 
gamble with a negative payoff for outcome B, those payoff amounts will be deducted from their 
$8 payment for completing the survey.
9    
For the third task, subjects predict the gamble choice of every other subject in their 
session.  In this task, and the subsequent task, subjects participated both as a target subject (i.e., a 
subject whose Task 2 gamble choice was to be predicted by the other subjects) and as a predictor 
subject (i.e., a subject who attempted to predict the Task 2 gamble choice of the target subject).  
Each predictor subject made n-1 predictions, where n = the number of subjects in the session.  To 
motivate predictors to make their best predictions, predictors earn $1 for every correct 
prediction.   
Two treatments are used in this task.  The VISUAL/SURVEY treatment (V/S hereafter) 
follows the EG procedure.  The EG protocol is ―…designed to activate subconscious stereotypes 
(p. 9).‖  A target stands up and the predictors predict the target’s gamble choice.  This procedure 
is followed for all subjects in a session.  All sessions are mixed gender and no mention of gender 
or visual characteristics is made so subjects are unaware of the purpose of the task.  After 
predictions are made for all targets, the predictors are provided the opportunity to revise their 
predictions in Task 4.  Targets are again asked to stand up in the same order, but this time 
additional information — the targets’ responses to two DSRAS survey ―likelihood of engaging 
in the activity‖ statements (one social and one financial) — are provided to the predictors.  The 
social risk statement is:  Arguing with a friend, who has a very different opinion on an issue; the 
financial risk statement is:  Investing 10% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.  
The predictors are informed of the target’s self-reported likelihood of engaging in each activity   10 
response for both statements.  Predictors are asked to again predict the target’s gamble based on 
this additional information.   
The financial statement survey response was provided to give the predictors 
individuating, judgment relevant information and the social statement response was provided to 
give individuating, judgment irrelevant information.  These two responses are used to determine 
if predictors recognize the type of information provided and apply it appropriately. The financial 
statement used was selected because it projects the air of a gamble since the statement refers to a 
―very speculative stock.‖
10  It was believed that, since both the gamble decision and the financial 
survey statement involve money placed at risk, a subject’s response to this statement and his 
gamble decision would be highly correlated.
11  Even more importantly, it was believed that 
predictors would believe that the two correlate well.  Targets’ responses to the financial 
statement provide predictors with individuated information more relevant to the action being 
predicted than to gender.   
The response to the social risk statement was provided to determine if predictors use or 
ignore information that should be irrelevant to the action being predicted.  While any one of the 
nonfinancial risk statements might have been used I wanted a statement that was as devoid of 
financial implications as possible.  Many of the possible alternatives involved risk that could 
have financial repercussions.  For example, some of the health and recreational risk statements 
involved activities that could lead to physical injury and financial consequences.  Some of the 
ethics statements involved illegal activities that could also have financial repercussions.  The 
―arguing with a friend‖ statement was selected since it has no obvious financial dimension and 
the type of risk it entails seems to be as different as possible from the risk involved with a   11 
gamble.  This would seem to be borne out by the fact that subjects’ responses to the two 
statements were uncorrelated (Spearman r = -0.027, p-value = 0.785). 
For the SURVEY/VISUAL treatment (S/V hereafter), the predictors are first given only 
the target’s two survey responses.  After predictions are made for all targets, the responses are 
again given while now the target is asked to stand up.  Predictors are asked to again predict the 
target’s gamble based on this additional information. 
The two-treatment design allows a test of whether predictions are driven by a gender 
stereotype, and whether the provision of individuating, judgment-relevant information about the 
subject’s risk-taking choices significantly diminishes the role of the stereotype. 
3.2.  Procedures 
All sessions of the experiment follow a standard procedure.  The experiment is conducted with 
pencil and paper in classroom settings.
12  Subjects are seated; consent forms are distributed, 
signed, and then collected.  Instructions, DSRAS survey forms, and slips of paper with ID 
numbers are randomly distributed.  The instructions are read aloud and subjects are instructed 
that if they have any questions they should raise their hands and one of the experimenters will 
answer their questions.  Subjects are informed that they will be paid $8 for completing the 
DSRAS survey.   
After all subjects have completed the DSRAS survey the forms are collected.  
Instructions and forms for the gamble choice task are then distributed.  Subjects are presented 
with the six gambles and asked to choose one.  After making their gamble choices, subjects 
deposit their forms in a box at the front of the room.   
Once the gamble choice task is completed the instructions and forms for the initial 
prediction task are distributed.  For the V/S treatment, subjects are called one-by-one by ID   12 
number to stand up.  As a target subject stands, the predictors (i.e., the n-1 other subjects in the 
session) are asked to record their predictions for the target subject’s gamble choice.  This process 
is repeated for all subjects in the session.  For the S/V treatment, one-by-one an ID number is 
announced and that target’s survey responses are written on the blackboard (the statements are 
also written on the board).  Predictors record a prediction for the target.  This process is repeated 
for all subjects in the session. After predictions are recorded for all subjects in a session, the 
forms are collected. 
Instructions and forms for Task 4 are then distributed.  Subjects are told they can revise 
their previous predictions based on the new information to be provided.  For the V/S treatment, 
subjects are called one-by-one by ID number to stand up.  In addition to having the target subject 
stand, the target’s survey responses are written on the blackboard (along with the statements).  
Predictors record their new predictions for the target.
13  This process is repeated for all subjects 
in the session.  For the S/V treatment, one-by-one an ID number is announced with that subject’s 
two survey responses written on the blackboard.  In addition, the target is also called upon to 
stand.  Predictors record their new prediction for the target.  This process is repeated for all 
subjects in the session.  After everyone completes Task 4 the forms are collected.  While 
earnings are calculated, subjects complete a survey to collect subject characteristics (see 
Appendix). 
Five subjects from each session (20 in total) are selected at random for payment (subjects 
are informed of this fact at the onset of each session).  Index cards with ID numbers on them are 
placed in a box and a randomly selected subject draws five cards from the box.  The five chosen 
subjects each roll a six-sided die to determine whether Event A or B occurs for the gamble 
choices they made in Task 2.  A roll of 1, 2, or 3 results in Event A; a roll of 4, 5, or 6 results in   13 
Event B.  The chosen subjects also receive an extra $1 for every correct Task 4 revised 
prediction.  Subjects are privately informed of their individual earnings and paid.  They are then 
free to go. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the design of the experiment and on the findings of previous research, the following 
hypotheses are made (a brief justification for each follows): 
H1. Gamble choices are independent of treatment.   
Treatment procedures are the same through Task 2 so there should be no differences in gamble 
choices by treatment. 
H2. Male subjects are less risk averse than female subjects. 
Findings from previous studies suggests that men are less risk averse than women. 
H3. Subjects will condition their initial predictions on the information available. 
Prior evidence indicates that subjects will employ gender stereotyping when the only information 
available are visual clues and they will use individuating information when it is the only 
information available. 
H4:  In the V/S treatment, predictions will not be significantly revised away from gender 
stereotyping in response to the individuating, judgment-relevant information provided.   
The gender stereotype regarding differences in risk preferences appears, based on the prior 
studies, to be a strongly held stereotype.  Furthermore, predictors are predicting trait-related 
behavior.  Both factors argue against substantial revisions of the initial predictions.   
H5:  In the S/V treatment, predictions will be significantly revised away from individuating, 
judgment-relevant information in response to the gender stereotyping information provided.     14 
The gender stereotype regarding differences in risk preferences appears, based on the prior 
studies, to be a strongly held stereotype.  Furthermore, predictors are predicting trait-related 
behavior.  Both factors argue for substantial revisions of the initial predictions.   
H6:  Additional information, regardless of its nature, should improve or at least not decrease) 
the accuracy of predictions.  
If the additional information is judgment-relevant, it can be used in place of judgment-irrelevant 
information to improve the accuracy of predictions.  If the additional information is judgment-
irrelevant, it can be ignored.  
 
4.  RESULTS 
4.1.  Subject Characteristics 
A total of 90 individuals (51 men and 39 women) made useable gamble predictions in the 
experiment.
14  There were four sessions with 17, 21, 25, and 27 participants.  There were two 
sessions for each treatment.  Fifty-two subjects participated in S/V sessions and 38 subjects in 
V/S sessions.  Table 2 reports subject characteristics by treatment.  There are no significant 
differences in characteristics across treatments.  Sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and 
the 20 subjects who were paid earned an average of $33.50.  
4.2.  Gamble Choices 
Table 3 reports mean gamble choices for all subjects by treatment and by gender.  The overall 
mean gamble choice is 4.16 (std. dev. = 1.35).
15  Mean gamble choice in the S/V treatment is 
4.19 (std. dev. = 1.17); mean gamble choice in the V/S treatment is 4.13 (std. dev. = 1.58).  A 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample test cannot not reject the null hypothesis that gamble choices do not 
differ by treatment (p-value = 0.96).
16  Women are only slightly more risk averse than men: the   15 
mean gamble choices for women and men are 4.05 (std. dev. = 1.12) and 4.25 (std. dev. = 1.51), 
respectively (means test and Wilcoxon Two-Sample test p-values ≥ 0.45).  This result is 
consistent with the findings of Daruvala (2007) and Grossman and Lugovskyy (2011).
17  This 
gives the first two results: 
Result 1:  Gamble choices are independent of the experiment’s treatments.  H1 is 
supported. 
Result 2:  Gamble choices did not differ significantly by gender.  H2 is not supported. 
4.3.  Initial Gamble Predictions 
In the absence of gender stereotyping, a predictor’s optimal strategy is to guess the mode (as 
opposed to the mean) of the targets’ gamble choices and predict that for all targets.  If the 
predictor is influenced by a gender stereotype, then, when the target’s gender is known, the 
optimal strategy is to try to guess the mode gamble choice of each gender and predict that 
gamble for all targets of that gender.  In the V/S (S/V) treatment, predictors know (do not know) 
the gender of their targets when making their P1s.  Results suggest that few predictors employ 
the optimal strategy instead they attempt to individualize their predictions.  Less than one-third 
(10 of 38) of the predictors in the V/S treatment use the optimal strategy.  An extra two 
predictors applied the optimal strategy when predicting for females targets.  No predictor in the 
S/V treatment made the same prediction for all targets, regardless of gender, in their session.   
Table 4 reports the mean of Task 3 predictions (P1) by treatment, gender of the predictor, 
and gender of the target.  The mean gamble prediction (P1*) reported is calculated as follows:  
P1* = 1/n∑    ∑        
   
 
     
 
where i = the number of predictors and j = the number of targets.
18  P1* is calculated for each 
predictor gender/target gender pairing.  In the V/S treatment the predictors have initially only   16 
visual clues on which to base their predictions; in the S/V treatment predictors have only the 
targets’ survey responses on which to base their predictions.  Regardless of the treatment, both 
male and female predictors predict a significantly higher gamble choice for male targets than for 
female targets.
19  In both treatments and for all predictor gender/target gender pairings, means 
tests and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks tests both reject the null hypothesis of no 
differences in predictions for male and female targets (p-values ≤ 0.08).
20 
Before making their initial predictions, predictors in the V/S treatment visually observe 
the gender of the targets; in the S/V treatment predictors are provided the targets’ survey 
responses.  How well these factors correlated with the riskiness of the target’s gamble choice is 
reported in Table 5.  The Spearman correlation coefficient for target’s Task 2 gamble choice and 
target’s gender (1 = male) is 0.237; target’s response to the financial risk statement (Investing 
10% of your annual income in a very speculative stock, mean response = 2.55; std. dev. = 1.18) 
is 0.138; and target’s response to the social risk statement (Arguing with a friend, who has a very 
different opinion on an issue, mean response = 3.88; std. dev. = 1.02) is 0.217.  All three of the 
target characteristics except, surprisingly, the target’s response to the financial risk statement are 
positively and significantly correlated with the target’s gamble choice (p-values ≤ 0.04 in each 
case, p-value = 0.18 for the financial risk statement). 
Whether these factors are actually correlated with gamble choice is, for the purposes of 
this paper, unnecessary.  What is necessary is that the predictors believe the factors contain 
useful information about a target’s gamble choice (i.e., do they behave as if they believe these 
factors contain useful information).  When the information is provided, predictors can decide that 
either the information is irrelevant and ignore it when making their predictions or that the 
information has predictive value and incorporate the information into their prediction decisions.    17 
If the latter, and if predictors generally interpret the information in the same way, then the 
information should be either positively or negatively correlated with the predictions made.    
Table 6 reports regression results for ordered Probit with clustered standard errors for 
each treatment (gamble choices are ordered from 0 (for gamble 1) to 5 (for gamble 6).
21  The 
results indicate that initial predictions in the S/V treatment are significantly correlated with the 
two survey responses:  FINANCIAL RISK STATEMENT and SOCIAL RISK STATEMENT.  
The results suggest that predictors treat both survey responses, regardless of the type of risky 
behavior assessed, as predictive of gamble behavior.  For the V/S treatment, the results indicate 
that initial predictions are significantly correlated with the MALE TARGET (male = 1).  In both 
treatments, predictions are conditioned on the PREDICTOR GAMBLE CHOICE and the results 
suggest that more risk-loving predictors assume others are likewise more risk loving.  MALE 
PREDICTOR (male = 1) is insignificantly correlated with P1.  These findings give the third 
result:  
Result 3:  Predictors condition their initial predictions based on the target information 
provided.  H3 is supported. 
4.4.  Revised Gamble Predictions 
Table 7 reports the mean of the Task 4 revised predictions (P2) by treatment, gender of the 
predictor, and gender of the target.  The mean gamble prediction (P2*) reported is calculated as 
follows:  
P2* = 1/n∑    ∑        
   
 
     
 
where i = the number of predictors and j = the number of targets.
22  In the V/S treatment the 
predictors now have the targets’ two survey responses in addition to visual clues as a basis for 
their revised predictions; in the S/V treatment predictors now have visual clues in addition to the   18 
targets’ two survey responses as a basis for their revised predictions.  As with the initial 
predictions, for every predictor gender/target gender pairing, in both treatments, means tests and 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks tests both reject the null hypothesis of no differences in 
predictions for male and female targets (p-values ≤ 0.01). 
To assess if and how the predictors make use of the additional information provided to 
them prior to their making their revised predictions, I tested whether P2 was significantly 
different from P1.  Table 8 reports the sign of the change (P2 – P1) and p-values for both paired 
means tests and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks tests by treatment, gender of the 
predictor, and gender of the target.  In the V/S treatment, providing the predictors with the 
targets’ survey responses resulted in no significant changes in predictions for all but one 
predictor gender/target gender pairing.  After receiving the survey responses, only females 
predicting for male targets significantly revised their predictions down (paired means test p-value 
< 0.03; Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test p-value < 0.04).  
In the S/V treatment, the additional information (visual clues) about the targets provided 
to predictors resulted in significant changes in predictions for every predictor gender/target 
gender pairing but one, and, more importantly, the direction of the changes is consistent with 
gender stereotyping.  After receiving the visual clues, both male and female predictors 
significantly raised their predictions for male targets (paired means test p-values < 0.06; 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test p-values < 0.01). Female predictors significantly 
lowered their predictions for female targets (paired means test p-value = 0.02; Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test p-value = 0.03).  Only males’ predictions for female targets 
were not lowered significantly.
23    19 
Table 9 reports regression results for ordered Probit with clustered standard errors for P2 
for each treatment.
24  P1 is included to control for the information provided when making the 
initial prediction (i.e., the predictor’s own gamble choice and whether the predictor was male, as 
well as whether the target was male in the V/S treatment and the survey responses in the S/V 
treatment).  The reported results are consistent with the results reported in Table 8.  In the V/S 
treatment the revised predictions are not significantly affected by the newly provided 
FINANCIAL RISK STATEMENT and SOCIAL RISK STATEMENT survey responses.  In the 
S/V treatment the revised predictions are significantly and positively correlated with the newly 
provided visual information (MALE TARGET).
25  The revised predictions are, not surprisingly, 
strongly and positively determined by the initial predictions (Prediction1), regardless of the 
treatment.   These findings give the fourth and fifth results: 
Result 4:  In the V/S treatment, the initially provided visual clues dominate subsequently 
provided individuating, judgment-relevant and irrelevant information.  Subjects hold fast 
to their gender-stereotyped predictions.  H4 is supported.  
Result 5:  In the S/V treatment, the initially provided individuating, judgment-relevant and 
irrelevant information is discounted by predictors in favor of gender stereotypes when the 
gender of targets becomes known.  Individuating, judgment-relevant (or irrelevant) 
information does not suppress stereotyping.  H5 is supported. 
Results 4 and 5 may be explained by what the Psychology literature calls the anchoring 
effect.
26  Anchoring occurs when individuals focus too much on some initial stimulus (relevant 
or irrelevant) resulting in a systematic bias in their responses to a subsequent question.  Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) define anchoring as when ―…different starting points yield different 
estimates which are biased towards the initial values (p.185).‖  Mussweiler (2001) shows that   20 
anchoring effects are lasting, Wilson et al. (1996) reports that neither forewarning of the 
phenomenon nor providing incentives to be accurate eliminated anchoring effects, and 
Thorsteinson et al. (2008) finds that highly applicable anchors had a greater effect than less 
applicable anchors.   
In this experiment, gender appears to be the anchor on which subjects based their 
ultimate predictions.  As noted earlier, there is considerable evidence (across a wide variety of 
risk domains) that men are less risk averse than women.  In the V/S treatment, subjects may have 
entered the experiment anchored to the gender stereotype and perceiving it as a highly applicable 
stereotype.  The survey responses, however applicable, may not have been perceived as 
sufficiently more useful to warrant dismissing the gender stereotype.    In the S/V treatment, the 
gender stereotype was initially irrelevant since no visual clues were provided.  Subjects had only 
the survey responses on which to condition their initial predictions.  The responses were 
perceived to be sufficiently applicable and were employed in making the initial predictions.  
When, however, the visual clues were provided, the gender stereotype may have been perceived 
as sufficiently more useful to warrant dismissing the survey responses.  
4.5.  Accuracy of Predictions 
I consider: 1) the change in prediction accuracy from P1 to P2 by treatment; 2) the prediction 
accuracy of men versus women holding the gender of the target and treatment constant; and 3) 
whether or not prediction accuracy differed between treatments holding the predictor 
gender/target gender pairings constant. 
4.5.1.  P1 versus P2.  Table 10 reports mean accuracy rates of P1 and P2 by treatment and 
predictor gender/target gender pairings.
27  Consider first the V/S treatment results.  The accuracy 
of predictions for male targets was virtually unchanged from P1 to P2, while the accuracy of   21 
predictions for female targets improved from P1 to P2, but the change in accuracy rates was 
insignificant (both means tests and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks tests p-values > 0.10) 
in every case, except for males predicting for females (p-values < 0.10).  In the S/V treatment 
accuracy rates declined for each predictor gender/target gender pairing except Female/Female, 
but in every case the change was insignificant (means tests and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed 
Ranks tests p-values > 0.10).  These findings give the sixth result. 
Result 6:  Additional information, regardless of the type, does not significantly improve 
predictors’ accuracy rates.  H6 is not supported. 
4.5.2.  Men versus Women
28.  Table 11 reports p-values for tests comparing the prediction 
accuracy of men and women, controlling for treatment and gender of the target.  In the V/S 
treatment, men are significantly more accurate than women when predicting for male targets 
(both means test and Wilcoxon Two Sample test p-values < 0.01 for both P1 and P2).  There is 
no significant difference in accuracy when predicting for female targets.
29  In the S/V treatment, 
the only significant difference in accuracy is in P2s for female targets.  Women are significantly 
more accurate than men in this case.  These findings give Observations 1 and 2: 
Observation 1:  When predicting based on visual clues only, men are significantly more 
accurate than women when predicting for men.  The addition of individuating, judgment-
relevant and irrelevant information does not alter the relative accuracy of men and women 
predictors.    
Observation 2:  When predicting based on individuating, judgment-relevant and irrelevant 
information only, neither men nor women are significantly more accurate.  The addition of 
visual clues significantly improves only the accuracy of women relative to that of men when 
predicting for female targets.      22 
  At first glance, these observations seem to be contradictory.  Instead, they suggest a 
gender difference in the ability to interpret the information provided and that the order in which 
information is provided matters.   The reported results suggest that male predictors are better able 
than are female predictors to interpret visual clues (in isolation) for male targets; men are better 
able to ―read‖ other men than they are women.  The addition of the survey responses neither 
significantly improves nor diminishes predictors’ relative accuracy for either target gender.  
Regardless of gender, predictors are not easily able to interpret the survey response clues.  
However, female predictors are better at ―reading‖ the combination of the survey and then the 
visual clues for other women.  For male predictors, the addition of visual clues does not improve 
their ability to ―read‖ their targets, regardless of gender.  This suggests that male predictors’ 
―readings‖ of male targets are diminished by the survey information.   
4.5.3.  V/S versus S/V.  Finally, Table 12 reports the results of comparing accuracy rates in the 
V/S treatment and accuracy rates in the S/V treatment controlling for the predictor gender/target 
gender pairings.  For P1, there is no significant difference between treatments in the accuracy of 
predictions for female targets, regardless of the predictors’ gender (p-values > 0.10).
30  Where a 
significant difference is observed it is in the accuracy of predictions for male targets.  Men 
predicting for other men do significantly better using visual clues than they do using 
individuating information (both means test and Wilcoxon Two-Sample test p-values < 0.05).  
Women predicting for men do significantly better using individuating information than they do 
using visual clues (both means test and Wilcoxon Two-Sample test p-values < 0.05).   
For P2, again, a significant difference between treatments is observed only in the 
accuracy of predictions for male targets.  Men still predict better for other men in the V/S 
treatment than they do in the S/V treatment.  As noted in section 4.5.2, in the V/S treatment, men   23 
seem to ignore the new individuating information provided prior to making their P2, and as such 
their accuracy rate is little changed.  Likewise, women still predict better for men in the S/V 
treatment than they do in the V/S treatment.  Like men, women in the V/S treatment seem to 
ignore the new individuating information provided prior to making their P2.  In the S/V 
treatment, the new visual clue information provided reduces women’s accuracy, but not enough 
to eliminate the significant difference.   These findings give Observations 3 and 4. 
Observation 3:  Men predicting for men are significantly more accurate when predicting 
based on visual clues versus survey responses; women predicting for men are significantly 
more accurate when predicting based on individuating information versus visual clues.  
Additional information, of either type, does not significantly alter the accuracy of 
predictors. 
Observation 4:  Neither visual clues nor individuating information significantly improves 
the accuracy of either gender when predicting for women. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This study reports: 1) additional evidence of the existence of gender stereotyping, and more 
importantly 2) the persistence of such stereotyping even when other, both judgment-relevant and 
judgment-irrelevant, individuating information is provided.  Subjects participate in one of two 
treatments of a four-task experiment.  In Task 1, subjects complete a survey designed to elicit 
attitudes toward different types of risk.  In Task 2, subjects play a gamble exercise, and in Task 
3, subjects attempt to predict the Task 2 gamble choice made by their fellow subjects based on 
either only visual clues or only responses to two survey statements (the individuating   24 
information).  In Task 4, subjects are provided additional information about their targets, either 
the survey responses or the visual clues, and are permitted to revise their initial predictions.  
As expected, gamble choices do not differ significantly by treatment.  Treatment 
procedures are identical through the gamble choice task.  I also do not find that gamble choices 
differ significantly by gender; women are only marginally more risk averse than men.  This 
result is consistent with the findings of Daruvala (2007) and Grossman and Lugovskyy (2011).            
Results from Task 3 of the experiment suggest that, in general, predictors do not adopt 
the optimal strategy of trying to guess the mode gamble choice and then predicting that gamble 
choice for all targets.  Instead, they appear to try to use any available information they do have to 
individualize their predictions.  In particular, I find strong evidence consistent with the 
conclusion that when given only visual clues, predictors, when making their initial predictions, 
default to the gender stereotype that women are more risk averse than men.  Predictions for male 
targets are significantly higher than predictions for female targets (mean predictions differ by 
approximately one gamble choice)   
Subjects with (only) individuating information (i.e., the survey responses) use this 
information, both judgment relevant and judgment irrelevant, to make their initial predictions 
(i.e., subjects appear to treat information of risk preferences, regardless of domain, as useful 
information for predicting risk preferences in similar or even different domains).  Predictions for 
male targets are still higher than predictions for female targets (but the mean predictions differ 
by less than one-half gamble choice).  This reflects the fact that males indicated significantly less 
risk aversion than did women in their responses to the financial risk survey statement (there was 
little gender difference in the responses to the social risk statement).       25 
Results from Task 4 of the experiment provide additional evidence of gender stereotyping 
and evidence that gender stereotyping dominates individuating, judgment-relevant and judgment-
irrelevant, information.  Predictors, when provided visual clues first and individuating 
information second, do not systematically revise their predictions away from their initial gender 
stereotyped predictions.  Predictions for all predictor gender/target gender pairings are virtually 
unchanged.  The one exception is that female predictors significantly revise downward their 
predictions for male targets.  
Predictors, when provided the individuating information first and the visual clues second, 
do systematically and significantly revise their predictions to reflect the gender stereotype.  
Predictions for male targets are revised upward by both male and female predictors; predictions 
for female targets are revised downward by both male and female predictors.  
  The findings reported offer a caution to those who might rely upon their ability to ―read‖ 
an individual or to acquire useful information from survey instruments.  While the information 
garnered from such cursory interactions and surveys may be used to inform their assessment of 
the risk attitudes of others, my results suggest that their assessments are likely to be colored, and 
possibly dominated, by the gender stereotype.  The gender stereotype that women are more risk 
averse than men appears to be a salient anchor, regarded by predictors as relevant, that colors 
assessments of risk attitude.  Furthermore, my findings suggest that as an anchor, the gender 
stereotype is a sufficiently strong anchor such that additional, individuating, information is 
largely dismissed. 
The implications of this strongly and widely held gender stereotype are potentially life 
altering.  An individual’s risk preferences can influence educational, financial, legal, and medical 
decisions, to name a few, that are made over the course of a life.  In all of these, the advice of   26 
experts is often sought and that advice may be skewed by the expert’s potentially biased 
assessment of the individual’s risk preference.  Students may be steered toward career paths 
(e.g., a low-risk stable career in nursing as opposed to a higher-risk career as a doctor), into 
financial instruments (e.g., investment in blue chip stocks as opposed to growth stocks) or legal 
settlements (e.g., a sure thing settlement as opposed to taking the case to court with the risk of 
winning a lot or nothing), and medical procedures (e.g., a safe, noninvasive procedure versus a 
high-risk, high-return invasive procedure) that encompass too much or too little risk relative to 
what the individual might prefer.  
Gender stereotyping does not stop with risk.  Stereotypes regarding differences between 
men and women may exist along many dimensions.  Lavy (2008) reports that boys are assumed 
to excel at math and science while girls excel in other subjects.
31  Males are assumed to be more 
competitive than females.
32  Women are assumed to be more cooperative than men.
33  Croson 
and Gneezy (2009) argue that women are also assumed to be more generous.  Teachers, advisors, 
or bosses acting on these stereotypes, as opposed to actual individual preferences or behavior, 
may channel individuals into nonoptimal career paths, for both the individual and the employee, 
and other lifestyle choices.  
  Finally, the results reported also suggest that men may be better at interpreting the visual 
clues provided by other men, while women may be better at interpreting for males any 
individuating information that might be provided by assessment tools.  The results suggest that 
female clients should be wary of any advice coming from either male or female advisors, 
regardless of the basis for that advice.  Women, it would appear, are just harder to ―read‖ than 
men.  This is an area that merits greater exploration.       27 
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Table 1.  Gamble Choices, Expected Payoffs and Risk 
Choice  Event  Probability  Payoff  Expected 
Payoff  Risk* 
1  A  50%  $10  $10  0.0  B  50%  $10 
2 
A  50%  $18 
$12  6.0  B  50%  $6 
3 
A  50%  $26 
$14  12.0 
B  50%  $2 
4  A  50%  $34  $16  18.0 
B  50%  -$2 
5 
A  50%  $42 
$18  24.0  B  50%  -$6 
6 
A  50%  $44 
$18  26.0  B  50%  -$8 
 
* - defined as the standard deviation 
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Table 2: Subject Characteristics 
 
  Survey/Visual  Visual/Survey  Test Statistic 
p-value 
Male  51.9%  63.2%  p = 0.29* 
Age (mean)  21.7  20.8  p = 0.88** 
Minority  32.7%  18.4%  p = 0.13* 
Econ/Business  46.2%  31.2%  p = 0.16* 
Regular Religious 




















p = 0.85+ 
GPA 
< 2.00 
2.00 – 2.49 
2.50 – 2.99 














p = 0.94+ 
*   - binomial proportions test 
** - means test 
+  - χ
2 contingency table test 
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Table 3:  Gamble Choice by Treatment and by Gender 
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 Table 4:  Prediction 1 - Average Predicted Gamble Choices for Subjects by Treatment, 
Gender of Target, and Gender of Predictor 
 
Visual/Survey 
    Predicted Gamble for  Test statistics for differences in subjects’ 
mean predictions for men and women 
Predictors  N  Males  Females  All  t-test
  Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks test 
Male  24  4.53  3.56  4.18  5.40  p < 0.001 
    (1.37)  (1.60)  (1.40)  p < 0.001 
Female  14  3.83  2.94  3.55  5.34 
p < 0.001      (0.65)  (0.77)  (0.63)  p < 0.001 
All  38  4.27  3.33  3.94  7.36 
p < 0.001 
    (1.20)  (1.38)  (1.21)  p < 0.001 
Survey/Visual 
    Predicted Gamble for  Test statistics for differences in subjects’ 
mean predictions for men and women 
Predictors  N  Males  Females  All  t-test  Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks test 
Male  27  3.52  3.08  3.36  2.20 
p = 0.004      (0.67)  (0.81)  (0.65)  p = 0.03 




    (0.62)  (0.81)  (0.63)  p = 0.08 
All  52  3.62  3.21  3.47  2.83  p < 0.001      (0.65)  (0.82)  (0.65)  p = 0.006 
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Table 6:  Determinants of P1 - Ordered Probit Results with Clustered Standard Errors* 
(Dependent variable = P1) 
 
  Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Variable  VISUAL/SURVEY  SURVEY/VISUAL 










MALE TARGET  0.623
a 
(6.80)   
SOCIAL RISK STATEMENT    0.222
a 
(5.61) 
FINANCIAL RISK STATEMENT    0.514
a 
(9.42) 





     
Log LF  -1336.0  -2028.1 
N  859  1302 
Individuals  38  52 
* - Standard errors are clustered on the individual predictor. 
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Table 7:  Prediction 2 - Average Predicted Gamble Choices for Subjects by Treatment, 
Gender of Target, and Gender of Predictor 
 
Visual/Survey 
    Predicted Gamble for 
Test statistics for differences in 
subjects’ mean predictions for men 
and women 
Predictors  N  Males  Females  All  t-test
  Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks test 
Male  24  4.55  3.72  4.25  4.85  p < 0.001 
    (1.42)  (1.59)  (1.43)  p < 0.001 
Female  14  3.55  2.97  3.36  3.03 
p = 0.007      (0.70)  (0.44)  (0.56)  p = 0.01 
All  38  4.19  3.44  3.92  5.84 
p < 0.001 
    (1.28)  (1.33)  (1.25)  p < 0.001 
Survey/Visual 
    Predicted Gamble for 
Test statistics for differences in 
subjects’ mean predictions for men 
and women 
Predictors  N  Males  Females  All  t-test  Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks test 
Male  27  3.67  2.97  3.39  4.35 
p < 0.001      (0.77)  (0.86)  (0.70)  p < 0.001 




    (0.81)  (0.78)  (0.72)  p < 0.001 
All  52  3.87  3.09  3.53  7.62  p < 0.001 
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Table 8:  Tests of Differences between P2 and P1 
 








Signed Ranks Test 
Visual/Survey 
Male  Male  24  +  0.78  0.57 
Male  Female  24  +  0.14  0.20 
Female  Male  14  -  0.03  0.04 
Female  Female  14  +  0.81  0.70 
             
Survey/Visual 
Male  Male  27  +  0.06  0.01 
Male  Female  27  -  0.17  0.05 
Female  Male  25  +  0.01  0.01 





Table 9:  Determinants of P2 - Ordered Probit Results with Clustered Standard Errors* 
(Dependent variable = P 2) 
 
  Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Variable  VISUAL/SURVEY  SURVEY/VISUAL 






MALE TARGET    0.488
 a 
(6.71) 
SOCIAL RISK STATEMENT  0.017 
(0.58)    
FINANCIAL RISK STATEMENT  -0.0003 
 (0.01)    




     
Log LF  -1171.5  -1895.0 
N  859  1302 
Individuals  38  52 
* - Standard errors are clustered on the individual predictor. 
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Table 10:  Accuracy of Predictions:  P1 versus P2 
 
Treatment  Predictor  Target  N 
Accuracy Rate 
(Std. Dev.)  p-value < 







Male  Male  24  0.30 
(0.16) 
0.30 
(0.16)  0.46  0.64 
Male  Female  24  0.15 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.18)  0.08  0.10 
Female  Male  14  0.16 
(0.11) 
0.16 
(0.09)  0.75  1.00 
Female  Female  14  0.23 
(0.13) 
0.25 
(0.15)  0.61  0.81 
               
Survey/Visual 
Male  Male  27  0.21 
(0.13) 
0.19 
(0.10)  0.21  0.30 
Male  Female  27  0.19 
(0.13) 
0.19 
(0.11)  0.92  0.98 
Female  Male  25  0.26 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.10)  0.14  0.16 
Female  Female  25  0.24 
(0.11) 
0.28 
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Table 11:  Accuracy of Predictions:  Men versus Women 
 
Treatment  Target  Prediction 
Predictors’ Accuracy 
Rate  p-value < 







1  0.30  0.16  0.01  0.01 
2  0.30  0.16  0.01  0.01 
Females  1  0.15  0.23  0.11  0.07 
2  0.19  0.25  0.23  0.17 
             
Survey/Visual 
Male 
1  0.21  0.26  0.17  0.25 
2  0.19  0.21  0.36  0.39 
Female  1  0.19  0.24  0.12  0.06 





Table 12:  Accuracy of Predictions across Treatments 
 
Prediction  Predictor  Target 
Predictors’ Accuracy Rate  p-value < 






Male  Male  0.30   0.21  0.03  0.05 
Male  Female  0.15  0.19  0.35  0.10 
Female  Male  0.16  0.26  0.02  0.03 
Female  Female  0.23  0.24  0.79  0.94 
             
2 
Male  Male  0.30  0.19  0.01  0.03 
Male  Female  0.19  0.19  0.96  0.53 
Female  Male  0.16  0.21  0.08  0.06 
Female  Female  0.25  0.28  0.54  0.90 
 




You are asked to participate in a study of economic decision making.  The study will take approximately 
one hour to complete.  The study is comprised of four parts to be described at the appropriate time.   
 
 
FIVE of you will be selected at random and will be paid your earnings in cash.  Since you do not know 
whether or not you will be selected, you should try to make your best decision in every instance. 
 
 
Those selected to be paid will receive $8 for completing Part 1.  Earnings for Parts 2, 3, and 4 and your 
total earnings for the study will be determined by the decisions you and the other Players make.  How 
your compensation for Parts 2, 3 and 4 and your total compensation will be determined is explained below.   
 
Those selected to be paid will be paid in cash in at the end of the session. 
 
From this point on, with the exception of procedural questions addressed to the proctors, we request that 
there be no talking. 
 
 
You have been designated Player #   
 
You have been provided an index card with your player number.  Please keep this.  You will need to show 
this to collect your earnings if you are selected to be paid. 
 
Please enter this number in the designated spot on all of the decision sheets 
provided throughout this session.  Failure to enter your Player # will 
disqualify you from being selected for payment.   40 
Part 1 - Survey 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood of engaging in each activity.  Provide 
a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale: 
  _____________________________________________________________ 
1        2      3      4      5   
Extremely                 Not Sure                     Extremely 
         Unlikely                            Likely 
 
 
1.                Admitting that your tastes are different from those of your friends. 
2.                Arguing with a friend, who has a very different opinion on an issue. 
3.                Asking your boss for a raise. 
4.                Betting a day’s income at the horse races. 
5.                Buying an illegal drug for your own use. 
6.                Chasing a tornado by car to take photos that you can sell to the press. 
7.                Cheating a fair amount on your income tax. 
8.                Cheating on an exam. 
9.                Cosigning a new car loan for a friend. 
10.              Dating someone that you are working with. 
11.              Deciding to share an apartment with someone you don’t know well. 
12.              Disagreeing with your father on a major issue. 
13.              Driving home after you had three drinks in the last two hours. 
14.              Eating ―expired‖ food products that still ―look okay.‖ 
15.              Exploring an unknown city or section of town. 
16.              Forging somebody’s signature. 
17.              Frequent binge drinking. 
18.              Going camping in the wild. 
19.              Going down a ski run that is too hard or closed. 
20.              Going on a safari in Kenya. 
21.              Going on a two-week vacation in a foreign country without booking accommodations ahead. 
22.              Going white-water rafting at high water in the spring.   41 
23.              Ignoring some persistent physical pain by not going to the doctor. 
24.              Illegally copying a piece of software. 
25.              Taking a medical drug that has a high likelihood of negative side effects. 
26.              Traveling on a commercial airplane. 
27.              Plagiarizing a term paper. 
28.              Engaging in unprotected sex. 
29.              Investing 10% of your annual income in blue chip stock. 
30.              Investing 10% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. 
31.              Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (treasury bills). 
32.              Investing in a business that has a good chance of failing. 
33.              Lending a friend an amount of money equivalent to one month’s income. 
34.              Moving to a new city. 
35.              Never using sunscreen when you sunbathe. 
36.              Never wearing a seatbelt. 
37.              Not having a smoke alarm in or outside of your bedroom. 
38.              Openly disagreeing with your boss in front of your coworkers. 
39.              Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky diving). 
40.              Regularly riding your bicycle without a helmet. 
41.              Shoplifting a small item (e.g., a lipstick or a pen). 
42.              Smoking a pack of cigarettes per day. 
43.              Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue at a social occasion. 
44.              Spending money impulsively without thinking about the consequences. 
45.              Stealing an additional TV cable connection. 
46.              Taking a day’s income to play the slot-machines at a casino. 
47.              Taking a job where you get paid exclusively on a commission basis. 
48.              Trying bungee jumping. 
49.              Using office supplies for your personal business. 
50.              Wearing unconventional clothes.   42 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each situation.  Provide a 
rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale: 
 
  _____________________________________________________________ 
1        2      3      4      5   
Not at all                Moderately        Extremely 
         risky          risky          risky 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain from each situation.  
Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale: 
 
  _____________________________________________________________ 
1        2      3      4      5   
No benefits            Moderate               Great 




Part 2 - Gamble Choice 
 
In this part of the study you will select from among six different gambles the one gamble you would like 
to play.  The six different gambles are listed on your GAMBLE SELECTION SHEET.  You must select 
one and only one of these gambles.  To select a gamble place an X in the appropriate box.  Each gamble 
has two possible outcomes (Event A or Event B) with the indicated probabilities of occurring.  Your 
compensation for this part of the study will be determined by:  1) which of the six gambles you select; and 
2) which of the two possible events occur.   
 
Please note that if you should select gamble 4, gamble 5, or gamble 6 and Event B 
occurs, your losses will be deducted from your $8.00 initial earnings. 
 
For example.  If you select gamble 4 and Event A occurs, you will be paid $34.  If Event B occurs, you 
will have $2 deducted from your $8 survey completion fee. 
 
For every gamble, each event has a 50% chance of occurring. 
 
After you have selected your gamble the GAMBLE SELECTION SHEET will be collected by the 
proctor.   
 
At the end of the study, you will roll a six-sided die to determine which event will occur.  If you roll a 1, 
2, or 3, Event A will occur.  If you roll a 4, 5, or 6, Event B will occur. 
  
There will be a separate roll of the die for each Player.   43 




Player #  
 
 














A  $10  50%   
B  $10  50%   
         
2  A  $18  50%   
B  $6  50%   
         
3 
A  $26  50%   
B  $2  50%   
         
4 
A  $34  50%   
B  -$2  50%   
         
5 
A  $42  50%   
B  -$6  50%   
         
6  A  $44  50%   
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Part 3 – Initial Prediction 
 
GAMBLE PREDICTION (SURVEY/VISUAL Treatment) 
 
For this part of the study you will select which of the six gambles you predict each of the other Players 
selected for himself/herself.  One at a time, you will be informed how each Player you are predicting for 
responded when asked to ―indicate the likelihood of engaging in each activity‖ for the following two 
statements from the survey completed in part 1 of this session. 
 
The Statements are: 
 
1.  Investing 10% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. 
 
2.  Arguing with a friend, who has a very different opinion on an issue 
 
One at a time, the proctor will call out a Player # and that Player’s responses will be posted on the board.  
Please mark your prediction on your GAMBLE PREDICTION SHEET next to that Player’s #.   
 
For every correct match between a subject’s actual choice and your predicted choice for that subject, 
those selected to be paid will receive a bonus of $1. 
 
For example: 
If Player #40 selected gamble 2 for himself and you predicted that Player #40 would select gamble 5, you 
will receive no bonus. 
If Player #32 selected gamble 4 for herself and you predicted that Player #32 would select gamble 4, you 
will receive a $1 bonus. 
 
 
On the back side of this sheet for your referral is a replica of the original gamble selection table.  45 
Player #________ 
 
GAMBLE PREDICTION SHEET 
   
Enter your Player #. 
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Part 4 – Revised Prediction 
 
GAMBLE PREDICTION – REVISED 
 
For this part of the study you will be given the opportunity to revise your gamble predictions if you so 
choose.   
 
One at a time, each Player will stand.  The remaining Players will decide whether or not they wish to 
revise their previous gamble prediction.  Please enter a revised prediction even if it is unchanged from 
your original prediction on your GAMBLE PREDICTION SHEET -REVISED next to that Player’s 
#.     
 
For determining whether or not your prediction matches a subject’s actual choice, we will use your final 
(revised) prediction – the predictions in the right hand column.  Again, for every time your prediction 
matches the subject’s actual gamble choice you, if selected to be paid, will receive a bonus of $1. 
 
 
After all Players have stood up and all Players have made their predictions, the GAMBLE 
PREDICTION SHEETS will be collected by the proctor.  The final predictions will be recorded and 
compared with the gambles actually selected by the other Players.  Again, if you are selected for payment, 





At the end of the study, we will select FIVE PLAYER numbers at random.  Those selected will roll a six-
sided die to determine whether Event A or Event B for the gamble selected will occur.  If a 1, 2, or 3 is 
rolled, Event A will occur.  If a 4, 5, or 6 is rolled, Event B will occur. 
  
There will be a separate roll of the die for each Player. 
 
Those selected will then be paid their total earnings ($8 survey completion fee plus (minus) your earnings 
(losses) from the gamble plus any bonuses earned).  After completing a receipt form, they may leave. 
 
   
 
The study is then completed.   47 
Player #________ 
 
GAMBLE PREDICTION SHEET -REVISED 
   
Enter you Player #. 
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SUBJECT SURVEY SHEET 
 
PLAYER #________________         
 
 
1.  AGE_____________         
 
2.  What is your sex?  (Circle one number.)        01   Male    02   Female 
 
3.  Married? (Circle one number.)          01  YES              02  NO    
 
4.  Children? (Circle one number.)       01  YES       02   NO 
 
5.   Do you regularly attend religious services?  01  YES    02  NO 
 
6.  Which of the following categories best describes you?  (Circle one number.) 
 
01  Asian-American/Oriental     02  Black/African-American 
 
03  White/Caucasian         04  Hispanic-Black/Spanish-speaking Black  
 
05  Hispanic-White/Spanish-speaking White     06  Native American/American Indian   
 
07 Other (Please specify:_______________________________________) 
 
7.  Class  (Circle one number) 
 
01  Freshman          02  Sophomore          03  Junior          04   Senior          05   Graduate Student 
 
8.   Major  (Circle one number) 
 
01  Economics          02  Other Business          03  Psychology          04  Sciences           
 
05  Liberal Arts          06    Other 
 
9.  How many Economics classes have you taken at the university level?  (Circle one) 
 
None               One               Two               Three               Four               Five               Six                
 
More than Six 
 
10.  What is your GPA?  
 
00  below 2.00   01  2 to 2.49    02  2.5 to 2.99   03  3 to 3.49   
 
04  above 3.5   49 
* This work was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SBR-
0136684).  I would like to thank the instructors who provided me access to their classes and to 
Mana Komai and Lynn MacDonald for their helpful comments.  Thanks are also due to the 
editor of this journal and to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
 
Author: Professor, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 3800, Australia.  Phone 61-3-990-
20053, Fax 31-3-990-55476, E-mail Philip.Grosman@monash.edu 
 
                                                 
1 See Eckel and Grossman (2008), and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for reviews of the literature. 
2 See Bodenhausen et al. (1999) and Kunda and Thagrad (1996) for reviews of the evidence 
regarding dual-processes in stereotyping. 
3 EG’s focus, as is the focus of this paper, was on the gender of the target.  Predictors may have 
drawn clues from visual factors other than the gender of the target (e.g., manner of dress, 
hairstyle, or posture for example).  They, and I, did not collect this type of data.  
4 Gamble 6 has the same payoff as Gamble 5 but with higher associated risk.  This gamble is 
included to distinguish the risk-lovers. 
5 Subjects are paid for completing the task rather than just being given the money.  This is 
intended to engender a sense of ownership and help minimize any ―house money‖ effect (see 
Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
6 List et al. (2004) note the degree of social isolation can bias stated preferences.  While subjects 
were not informed that, later in the session, their responses to two of the survey questions would 
be revealed, nevertheless, it is possible that responses are biased because subjects surmised that 
their responses to the survey questions may be revealed at some later time in the session or 
possibly they did not believe that their responses were sufficiently anonymous (i.e., that the 
experimenter would be able to connect their names to their responses).    50 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The instrument, in its original and adapted form, has been used by Dave et al. (2010), Ball et al. 
(2010), Cardenas and Carpenter (2010), and Carpenter et al. (2009).  Gambles 1 – 5 are identical 
to EG’s gambles 1 – 5. 
8 As measured by standard deviation from the expected payoff.  Having payoff and risk increase 
linearly eliminates the possibility that a risk-averse subject would be indifferent between two 
gambles (possible if payoff increased faster than risk). More important is the instrument’s 
simplicity.  The fact that expected payoff and risk increase linearly and the 50/50 gambles make 
comparisons easy and requires only minimal math skills of the subjects.  Dave et al. conclude 
that the simpler Eckel and Grossman instrument ―… may provide better accessibility, and so 
more accurate measures of risk aversion, for subjects with low levels of analytic proficiency 
(p.30).‖   
9 If subjects are sufficiently loss averse, gamble choices may be biased down.  Eckel and 
Grossman (2008) test for this bias by eliminating their $6 payment for completing the survey and 
by increasing all gamble payoffs by $6 so that all gamble payoffs are non-negative.  They 
compared gamble choices with and without the possibility of negative payoffs and found no 
significant difference. 
10 Alternatives included: ―Investing 10% of your annual income in blue-chip stock‖ and 
―Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (treasury bills).‖  From past 
experience, student subjects were unfamiliar with the term ―blue-chip‖ stock (a low-risk 
investment) and treasury bills are relatively risk-free investments.  Neither alternative had the 
desired air of a gamble.   
11 Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that women choose less risky investment portfolios than 
men.  Barsky et al. (1997) finds women a lower propensity toward financial risk than men.  In an   51 
                                                                                                                                                             
experiment designed to mimic investment behavior, Powell and Ansic (1997) find that women 
choose less risky alternatives.  Levin et al. (1988) report that men are more likely than women to 
engage in risky behavior, such as gambling.  Barber and Odean (2001) show that, consistent with 
greater male overconfidence, men trade more aggressively than women in financial markets. 
12 Sessions were conducted in Saint Cloud State University (SCSU) classes not taught by the 
experimenter.  All sessions were conducted in introductory economics classes using the same 
classroom but for different classes.  Students were informed that in lieu of class the experiment 
would be conducted and that participation was voluntary.  If they did not wish to participate they 
were free to go.  Approximately five students per class elected not to participate.  SCSU has an 
enrollment of approximately 17,000 with a large contingent of nontraditional students and many 
commuters.  For these reasons and based on the experimenter’s own observations teaching 
introductory courses, the experimenter believed it was reasonable to assume that, with few 
exceptions, subjects did not know each other well.   
13 Predictors may record the same prediction they made in Task 3. 
14 Nine subjects were excluded for failing to indicate gender on the post-experiment survey or for 
not completing one or both of the prediction forms. 
15 One concern is that since only five subjects per session were paid, subjects may have treated 
their decisions as only hypothetical.  Comparing results from this experiment with those of 
Grossman and Lugovskyy (2011) in which all subjects were paid for their decisions suggests this 
is not so.  χ
2 contingency table tests comparing all decisions, decisions by men and decisions by 
females across the two studies cannot reject the null hypothesis that the gamble decisions are 
similarly distributed (p-values = 0.36, 0.64, and 0.49, respectively).   
16 All p-values are for two-tailed tests.   52 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 This appears to be a result of the extra gamble choice.  EG, which reported a significant 
difference, had one less gamble choice than the instrument used in this paper and Grossman and 
Lugovskyy (2011).  The additional gamble, while redistributing the choices among the riskier 
gambles (4 and 5 in EG versus 4 – 6 in this paper), did not increase the percentages of men 
choosing one of the riskier gambles (from 60.3% to 64.7%).  It did increase the percentage of 
women choosing one of the riskier gambles (from 30.8% to 66.7%). 
18 The definition of P1* recognizes that predictions by any predictor i are not independent (i.e., 
predictions by predictor i for target j=1 is likely to be dependent on predictions made by i for all 
other targets j ≠ 1).   In Table 4, V/S treatment, 4.53 is the mean of the mean prediction made by 
male predictors for male targets.  For each male predictor I calculated the mean prediction made 
by that predictor for all male targets.  I then calculated the mean of those mean predictions.  
19 For the S/V treatment, this reflects the fact that males indicated significantly less risk aversion 
than did women in their responses to the financial risk survey statement (means test p-value < 
0.10; Wilcoxon two-sample test p-value < 0.09).  There was little gender difference in the 
responses to the social risk statement (p-values < 0.82 for both a means test and a Wilcoxon two-
sample test). 
20 In this case, and all others, the most conservative result is reported. 
21 Standard errors are clustered on the individual. 
22 As with P1*, the definition of P2* recognizes that predictions by any predictor i are not 
independent (i.e., predictions by predictor i for target j=1 are likely to be dependent on 
predictions made by i for all other targets j ≠ 1).   It is calculated in the same way as P1*. 
23 The means test p-value for male predictors and female targets is insignificant (p-value < 0.17), 
but the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank test p-value is significant (p-value < 0.05).    53 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 Standard errors are clustered on the individual. 
25 In the V/S treatment, I interacted FINANCIAL RISK STATEMENT and SOCIAL RISK 
STATEMENT with gender of predictor/gender of target dummies.  While the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients were equal across these variables was rejected, the individual coefficients 
were insignificantly different from zero. In the S/V treatment, I replaced MALE TARGET with 
gender of predictor/gender of target, but this did not significantly improve the explanatory power 
of the model.  Results are available upon request.  
26 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
27 The accuracy rates reported are percentage of predictions that were correct averaged across all 
predictors in the specific grouping.  For example, for the V/S treatment in Table 9, the 24 male 
predictors predicting for male targets made correct predictions an average of 30.4 percent of the 
time. 
28 Previous work offers no basis on which to hypothesize regarding the expected findings when 
comparing the accuracy of predictions by men and women and across treatments.  For this 
reason, subsequent findings are labeled observations rather than results. 
29 The means test p-value is insignificant (p-value < 0.11), but the Wilcoxon Two-Sample test p-
value is significant (p-value < 0.05). 
30 For male predictors and female targets, the means test p-value is insignificant (p-value < 0.35), 
but the Wilcoxon Two-Sample test p-value is significant (p-value < 0.10). 
31 Lavy (2008) reports evidence of discrimination against boys in the grading of high school 
matriculation exams.  Results suggest that the bias is the result of teachers’ behavior.    
32 See Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), Gneezy et al. (2003), and Niederle and Vesterlund (2006). 
33 See Eckel and Grossman (2001) for a discussion of the literature. 